Security and Risk Management Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2750 words

Security and Risk Management - Essay Example A good and well thought out research project should follow a definite plan taking into account the following steps: (Denscombe, 2010: 321)  Ã‚   1.  Define the research question or what the objective of the research is.2.  Look up relevant and current sources of information from print and online sources like books, magazines, blog and forum comments and social media.3.  Determine and specify what the research will and will not cover i.e. boundaries of the project. 4.  Reevaluate the research question based on the nature and extent of information you have gathered and the boundaries of the research project. 5.  Select the most appropriate investigative methods and research tools depending on the type of research. 6.  Plan how you will go about the entire research project.7.  Begin to get the relevant information from libraries, interviews, surveys etc using the variety of methods at your disposal. 8.  Refine the search strategy if needed. 9.  Keep writing and organ izing data and notes critical and useful to writing out the research report. This also helps to keep track of all sources.10.  Evaluate the sources using appropriate criteria.11.  Synthesize, analyze and integrate information sources and prior knowledge about the subject area before writing the research report. 12.  Revise the hypothesis if needed. 13.  Begin working on the report using the gathered information effectively so that it meets the specific objectives that the report was needed for. 14. Keep in mind the rights to ownership of information, cost to collect the information and avoid plagiarism. 15. We have a duty to cite properly all the sources we have used, so that intellectual copyright is maintained and due credit is given for the sources of ideas. A Critical Review and Analysis of the Report on Shoplifting Presented by the Security Manager Working at the Large Departmental Store We will now review the research report on the issue of shoplifting prepared by the Security Manager of the large departmental store. Statement of the Problem: As noted, the first part of the research report, namely the Introduction, should clearly state the purpose and scope of the research, the research objectives or what the researcher is trying to prove or disprove regarding a particular topic. Though the topic of the research is stated, i.e. shoplifting, the security manager seeks to limit the purpose of the report by stating that it is only concerned with why the problem of shoplifting is occurring in the department store where he has been hired. He is not concerned with the general reasons for shoplifting, or what previous studies or reviews have found about this problem. By restricting its purpose and scope, it is only likely to be useful to the present management of the store, if at all. Secondly, since it appears to him that customers are the likely

Secret Intelligence Service and National Security Essay Example for Free

Secret Intelligence Service and National Security Essay The revolution in military affairs has given rise to powerful strategic tools such as effects based operations (EBO), mirrored by the concept of intelligence-led policing in law enforcement. Some advocates of intelligence change argue that the role of intelligence be expanded to provide the analytical power-house for ‘whole of government’ decision-making in relation not just to traditional threats, but also to this new range of threats—a kind of EBO for the whole of government. This article argues for a more limited view of intelligence and its role—one that recognises the inherently human, and hence secretive, quality of intelligence as a means for dealing with human-generated competition. A nation’s intelligence apparatus is only one small part of the wider machinery for delivering policy and executive action. Traditionally, the role of intelligence within this wider structure was to counter threat from some kind of human collective opposition—whether a country, a crime group or a terrorist organisation. Intelligence was regarded as a highly specific undertaking to give advantage over that threat in the form of knowledge, insight and predictive capacity. According to this model, advantage was sought over a human threat capable of learning and adapting. Intelligence therefore needed to be secret to deliver an advantage. To protect the ‘intelligence advantage’, countries also developed counter-intelligence organizations such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and MI5 and encoding and decoding organizations such as the US National Security Agency and the Australian Defence Signals Directorate. Today there is broad consensus that the threats we confront have expanded beyond the typical military or counter-intelligence threats of the past, especially those of the Cold War. This expanded range of threat falls into a major category and two sub-categories. The major category can be termed ‘non-conventional’ threats, ones that do not fall into the state-on-state category. They include environmental threats, threats of pandemic disease, terrorism and transnational crime. Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) 55 Security Challenges This broad category of non-conventional threat can be further divided between those threats of a human agency (terrorism, crime, people smuggling and trafficking) and those of a non-human agency (climate change and other types of environmental threat, natural disasters, pandemic disease). These two sub-categories are, however, closely linked, as demonstrated by Thomas Homer-Dixon and others. 1 They are linked in two ways. First, they are linked in the sense that so-called non-human agency threats such as climate change can give rise to instability. Instability can in turn give rise to many of the human generated conventional and non-conventional threats mentioned above. Second, threats like climate change are also linked with human agency in that they are often caused by human intervention. Changes in human behaviour are therefore necessary to remedy such threats. Even though these two sub-categories of threat are linked, they give rise to very different implications for the role of intelligence. On the one hand, the role of intelligence in countering human-related, nonconventional threat is relatively clear-cut and traditional. It includes counterterrorism, police intelligence, customs intelligence, coast watch intelligence and so on. All of these intelligence activities are characterised by the fact that they involve secret information that would be compromised if it were to leak out, and through its compromise would give the opposition (or threat) an intelligence advantage, or sacrifice the advantage enjoyed by the state. On the other hand, the non-conventional threats such as climate change, natural disasters or pandemic disease, entail no such secret, tightly held intelligence response. On the contrary, to counter such threats, especially in a liberal democracy like Australia, governments need to engage in a public dialogue with experts on the threat, whether those experts are scientists, journalists, medical or other experts operating in the public domain. This dialogue has to be public because the public needs to be taken along with the broad strategic changes required to deal with this type of threat. It also needs to be public and transparent because the scientific method is evidence based and depends on the capacity for peer review. Moreover, it is often difficult to achieve major changes in attitude to such threats in liberal democracies unless there is some kind of ‘tipping point’, either in terms of the concrete effects of the threat (catastrophic drought, for example, in the case of climate change) or public consensus on the science, or both. The concept of threat needs to be actualised right through the 1 Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt (eds), Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population and Security, Lanham, MD, Bowman and Littlefield, 1998, ‘Introduction: A Theoretical Overview’. 56 Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) Security Challenges community before radical behavioural change can occur. This is because the political system of liberal democracies is usually geared to the short-term advantage of governments according to the political cycle rather than the long-term advantage of the nation. In order to move beyond populist politics, the whole community needs to be aware of the circumstances and prepared to make sacrifices to deal with the threat. Indeed, it is well known by intelligence specialists that long-term assessments, while they may eventually prove accurate, are almost never acted upon by policy. For example, nearly twenty-five years ago a leading Australian intelligence assessment agency employed a scientist—the only person in the organization working on scientific issues at that time. The scientist predicted that overpopulation, scarcity of water and climate change would result in vast changes for the worse in the Middle East, South East Asia and South Asia, forcing major, economically induced out-migration. Such events, he assessed, would eventually challenge Australia’s security. Today such an assessment would be commonplace. But at the time, no action was taken. Although the mandate of the organization was to predict long-term change, the political system was not equipped to deal with uncertain judgements about what was then considered the ‘deep future’. Nor could a secret intelligence report enable governments to deal with such predictions through debate in the public domain. Further, since threats like climate change constitute threats to the ‘global commons’, by definition they can only be addressed by global cooperation rather than competition. A ‘beggar your neighbour’ approach will only lead the globe deeper into trouble. The implications for intelligence are significant. In terms of threats like climate change, pandemic disease and catastrophic economic change, intelligence ceases to concern itself with achieving an advantage over an enemy or competitor. So the question therefore arises: are secret intelligence agencies appropriate organizations to advise on such threats? Despite the intrinsic problems associated with the use of intelligence to analyse threats of this nature, increasingly, intelligence agencies are being coopted to advise on them. For example, we learn from the Sydney Morning Herald of 10 April 2007 that the Office of National Assessments (ONA) has been commissioned by the government to determine the security implications of climate change. We further learn from the ABC news on 23 May 2006, which describes the ONA Director General being quizzed by the Senate Estimates Committee, that ONA has received multiple taskings of this nature. But the public are prevented from accessing the outcome on the grounds that the ONA is an intelligence organization operating in the secret realm. Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) 57 Security Challenges True, the ONA is being asked to look at the security implications. But to do so, it would need to make a sound assessment of the nature and extent of climate change. No doubt the ONA now has a few scientifically trained people working on this and similar issues. But no doubt also, it will be locked in earnest consultation with the Commonwealth Science and Research Organisation (CSIRO), the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) and similar agencies and institutions. And it will also be carefully perusing the reports of the International Panel on Climate Change. In other words, ONA is not, in itself, able to report on this issue. Its role is, rather, to organize, validate and valorize all the noise out in the public domain concerning the issue. The same evidently applies in the US. According to Anne Harrington, Director of the Committee of International Security in the National Academy of Science in Washington, If you get the intelligence community to apply some of its analytical capabilities to this issue [climate change], it could be compelling to whoever 2 is sitting in the White House. But why should the Central Intelligence Agency suddenly have authority on this issue when the world’s leading scientific specialists, who have spent lifetimes working on the issue, have been studiously ignored—and some even silenced—by the White House for the past seven years? All this leads us to ask what, exactly, should be the role of intelligence in the so-called ‘new security environment’? And how should intelligence fit in with other government structures to provide an analytical capacity in these areas? Intelligence and Its Purposes The narrower view of intelligence agencies suggested above—that is, organizations that deal fundamentally with human competition and therefore by nature exist in the secret domain—has not so far been widely accepted. The advent of non-conventional threat has generated considerable discussion in the ranks of those advocating intelligence reform. Various commentators have called for a broadening of the informational base of the traditionally tightly held intelligence agencies and a more ‘whole-ofgovernment’ approach. However, very little of this discussion has drawn the distinction between human-induced and non-human induced threat in relation to the role of intelligence. Nor has it distinguished between longterm threat to society and the ‘global commons’ caused by environmental issues and short-term threat generated by problems such as transnational crime and terrorism. 2 Tom Allard, Mark Forbes and agencies, ‘US braces for global warring’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 April 2007. 58 Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) Security Challenges That is not to say that reform is not necessary, but rather that we need to be very clear what role intelligence should play in dealing with such threats and also where it should fit in to the wider ‘machinery of government’. Nor is it to claim that intelligence has no role at all in these matters: one very important role is to assess the security implications of issues like climate change, in order to prepare the state to meet those potential threats. Such a position does not imply, moreover, that some broader reform of the machinery of government would not be advantageous. But in deciding on the nature of that reform, we need to ensure that the tail of intelligence reform does not wag the dog of machinery of government reform. Nor is it to say that a discussion of intelligence reform should be considered in isolation from a discussion of wider issues to do with the machinery of government. Intelligence obviously has to be fitted in with the machinery of government, and how it fits in is important. Rogers correctly argues that the â€Å"practice of strategic intelligence is at its best when it is in counterpoise with strategic thinking [on the part of decision-makers and policy makers]†. 3 It follows that correct structure in the machinery of government should facilitate the connectivity between intelligence and policy on the one hand, and the consequent practice of strategic thinking in policy development on the other. But the problem here is that those involved with structuring intelligence do not necessarily have a say in the structuring of the machinery of government. And in any case, in a liberal democratic, federal structure such as Australia’s, a considerable proportion of government process is dictated by relatively immutable conventions and constitutions. We should also note that this issue of where intelligence sits in organisational structures is relevant both within a particular organization that uses intelligence, and also within the wider structures of state as supported by intelligence. In one case intelligence is embedded within the agency, in the other, it is embedded within the machinery of government. These two types and uses of intelligence may require very different structural approaches. In the case of the latter (intelligence agencies embedded in the machinery of government) it is the role of intelligence agencies to draw intelligence up and enable it effectively to be used in national policy-making. The structures used to ‘draw intelligence up’ are entirely proper considerations of a paper such as this on intelligence. This issue of the drawing up of intelligence covers the question of how a peak agency such as the ONA can best garner the wide range of intelligence that is required in today’s expanded threat environment. This expanded 3 Kevin Rogers ‘Developments in Australian Strategic Criminal Intelligence’ in Ratcliffe (ed) Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2004), p23. Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) 59 Security Challenges environment requires that the entire range of agencies producing intelligence be included—agencies such as the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Customs, Immigration, Coastwatch, Quarantine and the Australian Crime Commission (ACC). Structures to support this expanded role were discussed in an earlier paper by this author. But (alluding to the issues raised above), the expanded role for intelligence does not—or rather should not—include agencies such as the CSIRO, ABARE, the Productivity Commission, Geosciences Australia, the Department of Health, and so on. Unfortunately, this distinction is not always recognised or agreed in discussions about intelligence reform. For example, some have begun to questio n whether concepts like effects based operations (EBO), which in turn have been spawned by the new intelligence environment and new technologies, cannot be applied in a ‘whole-of-government’ way. According to this view, the three-way relationship between intelligence, policy and operations could be seen to apply across the spectrum of government decision-making, thus incorporating all departments of state and agencies in an endeavour to achieve a strategic outcome. Although such a project would be ambitious, ‘whole-of-government’ possibly can and should be made to function in a strategic sense. But it should be recognised that intelligence is not central to the process in the same way as it is central to EBO in a military setting or to intelligence-led policing in law enforcement. Indeed, in the author’s view, intelligence is a highly specific function to do with human competition and human enemies. It is not only inappropriate for wider use, but such use could be positively harmful in terms of the needed outcomes in government decision making in a democratic setting. Certainly, good strategic intelligence should be suggestive of courses of action, but only suggestive in the sense that the knowledge brought forward is suggestive. Intelligence can also comment on implications of actions when specifically asked to do so, but should not go the extra step of recommending options. It is not the role of intelligence to present analytical options to decision-makers in the same way as that is the role of a department of state or ministerial staff. The temptation to use intelligence agencies to support a strategic, ‘whole-ofgovernment’ approach is quite strong, however. Traditionally, intelligence agencies have been very close to the seat of power. Indeed, they were born Sandy Gordon, ‘Re-Shaping Australian Intelligence’, Security Challenges, vol. 1, no. 1 (November 2005), pp. 27-58. Brice Pacey, ‘National Effects-Based Approach: A Policy Discussion Paper’, Working Paper, no. 381, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2003, passim. Pacey is not, however, arguing for a central role for intelligence in this enterprise. . 4 60 Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) Security Challenges of a one-to-one relationship, in which the intelligence chief sat at the leader’s right hand. This was both to provide immediacy and preserve secrecy. The idea of a separation between intelligence and policy is a relatively recent one. The only separation that was once required was that between master and servant. The temptation to use intelligence agencies as analytical determinants of policy is even stronger in situations where there is no real alternative to the analytical powerhouses that some intelligence agencies can bring to bear. Moreover, governments that use intelligence agencies to consider politically sensitive issues like climate change have the added advantage of keeping such consideration outside the public domain and the scrutiny of oppositions. This is because once a matter is within the purview of intelligence, governments can claim they can ‘neither confirm or deny’ questions in respect of them. But as argued above, this is essentially a misuse of intelligence. Intelligence in National Strategic Decision-Making At the moment in Australia, national intelligence exists within a relatively tight framework of the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC), oversighted by a small and powerful group of departments and ministers, particularly Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC), Defence, Foreign Affairs and AttorneyGeneral’s Department. This tight structure is reinforced by the restricted membership of the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) and the Secretaries’ Committee on National Security (SCONS), which proffers advice to the NSCC. It is a structure that in its essence was bequeathed by the Cold War, with minor modifications as a result of the Flood Report and other developments. As such, it was designed to deal with state-on-state threat and the threat of spying and political violence rather than the broader range of threats we now confront. Such a tight structure has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are that the intelligence agencies of the AIC are well plugged in to the Canberra policy environment and have a nuanced appreciation of what the government wants to know. Equally, this tight structure allows for rapid, consensus decision-making when needed. Further, the agencies of the AIC, particularly the ONA, represent a collection of individuals capable of high-level strategic thinking. The disadvantages of such a tight system are well known. The 9/11 Commission and Butler report chronicled the distortion of the intelligence process to serve particular policy needs, or at least perceived needs. Given the tight inter-relationship between the government, key departments and intelligence agencies in Australia, such distortions are also possible here. Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) 61 Security Challenges The Butler committee report also emphasised the dangers of a filtration system such as the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) standing between the judgements of experts and policy-making bodies. Some of the worst errors evident in the so-called ‘Dirty Dossier’ arose because the expertise in the Defence Intelligence Staff was filtered out or distorted, either as a result of a classic ‘broken telephone’ situation or through pre-judging the policy bias on the part of the JIC. In Australia, the system would be equally vulnerable should the findings of organizations like ABARE and the CSIRO be filtered through a small, nonexpert (in the disciplines involved) organization like the ONA. How suitable is the present Australian structure in light of the changes to the regional, global and technological environments? Before considering this important issue, let us consider the needs of a system designed effectively to operate in the new environment. x As discussed above, such a system would need to delineate a specific role for intelligence, one that relates to human-on-human competition, and that in turn necessitates a secret approach to intelligence. Such a system would also need to be capable of melding the intelligence product with product from other agencies working on issues that do not require secret intelligence and with other open sources. It would need to be flexible. That is, it would need the capacity to draw to a greater or lesser degree on a ‘whole-of-government’ approach for supporting information and judgment, depending on the urgency and nature of the threat and degree of secrecy needed. In other words, it would need to have the administrative means to ‘slide up and down the scale’ between a narrow, decision-making capacity at the top and a broad consensus model below, one that included information and analysis from a range of agencies, not only intelligence agencies but also economic and scientific agencies. In some instances, it would need to shape decisions for the longerterm. Yet it would also need to be capable of making adjustments in light of the evolving evidence. Such decisions would need to be maintained well outside the life span of a typical Australian Government. At times it would need to draw in two, or perhaps even three, levels of government, as already evident in the case of terrorism and pandemic threats such as SARS and ‘Bird Flu’. It would need to be well connected internationally in order to draw on available information and assessment. x x x x 62 Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) Security Challenges x Above all, it would need a powerful apex analytical and organisational capacity containing a range of expertise in order to bring together diverse lines of information, identify real problems, set priorities between them and devise viable strategies to deal with those priorities. This role should not be undertaken by existing intelligence agencies, because their role should be confined to the analysis and dissemination of intelligence. To use them in the dual role of policy advice and intelligence analysis and dissemination would be unduly to compromise the intelligence role. How well does the present system meet the needs outlined above? In some respects, quite well. It basically consists of a tight core capable of being expanded to meet a broadening of threat, with the NSCC providing a sort of ‘inner cabinet’, surrounded by a tight supportive framework consisting of key departments, SCONS and the AIC. It is a highly functional arrangement for an environment requiring a high degree of secrecy and relatively rapid decision-making. Where the nature of threat broadens, for example in the case of climate change, the current system is capable of rapid expansion. Members of Cabinet, such as the environment minister, can be brought into the NSCC where necessary. The AFP Commissioner, CEO of Customs and others can also be inducted into the SCONS when necessary. Within PMC, the National Security Division (established in 2003) provides a potential analytical unit that is not confined to intelligence, but that can range over the available government and non-government agencies, given its location on the ‘commanding heights’ of PMC. The present system falls down in a number of respects, however. It is deficient in that certain information deemed intelligence in the narrower sense outlined above is still not fully drawn into the AIC information network and database (AICNET). Nor are the organizations generating this intelligence (such as the AFP, Customs and the ACC) included in the tight deliberative network at the apex of government decision-making, at least not on a day-today basis. These exclusions cause a deficit in knowledge and a nalysis of non-conventional, but human-induced, threat. This deficit was discussed in greater detail in an earlier paper. 6 6 Gordon, op cit. At the time of final preparation of this paper, the government has announced a new system of combining the databases of Customs, Immigration and ASIO. One might well ask why this is only being done now, six years after the events of 9/11? Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) 63 Security Challenges x It is not capable of adopting strategic thinking across all levels of government in the federal structure—the so-called ‘EBO of governance’. Because of the requirements of the liberal democratic federal structure, however, this problem may not be amenable to an entirely satisfactory solution. Even given the restraints imposed by our political system, there is inadequate capacity at the top to analyse, identify and give priority order to threat. Although the National Security Division of PMC seems to be set up to undertake this role, according to Pacey, the division is still limited by coordination roles and the need to deal with immediate crises rather than provide long-term analysis. 7 In counter-terrorism, for example, the role of PMC is to provide a multi-government and multi-disciplinary platform. One suspects that this demanding role diminishes its capacity to deliver long-term policy advice. In the absence of an appropriate analytical unit outside the confines of intelligence, there currently seems to be a growing de facto move to recruit the ONA for this top-level analytical role, as discussed above. But, as also argued above, the ‘heavy lifting’ on matters like climate change should not be conducted by a secret intelligence organization at all, but through transparent, evidence-based techniques that are well tried and understood in scientific organizations. Moreover, to place an organization like the ONA at the apex of the policy advice structure is, at least in a de facto sense, to bring it directly into the policy-making apparatus—hitherto considered anathema for an intelligence organization. x x Therefore, if we accept the more limited role for intelligence advocated in this paper, we are left with a potential deficit in terms of an apex analytical unit— the intellectual powerhouse of ‘EBO of governance’. The main candidate for fulfilling such a role seems to be the National Security Division of PMC. And in fact, more and more of the capacity relating to security in areas requiring a multi-disciplinary approach is now located in PMC. This includes terrorism, energy security, pandemic disease, nuclear energy and intelligence. Conclusion and Issues for the Next Government In light of the profound changes in the security environment we have witnessed in recent years, those responsible for shaping the way governments will deal with long-term structural change confront a choice. 7 Pacey, op. cit. , p. 5. 64 Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) Security Challenges On the one hand, they can advocate an expansion of the role of intelligence to cover the broader nature of the threat we now confront. In a de facto sense, the current arrangement seems to be drifting toward this kind of arrangement. On the other, they can continue to regard intelligence as an essentially secret function designed to give advantage and deny advantage in terms of human competition, whether of the state-on-state variety or threats from criminal and terrorist groups. In this paper we have argued the latter position. We have done so because of concerns about the nature of intelligence and how it differs from policy analysis, the nature of scientific inquiry and the democratic need for debate and consensus. We have further argued that, while it may be possible to achieve something close to a strategic process on a ‘whole-of-government’ basis, such a process cannot be driven by intelligence; and nor is it correctly placed within a discussion of intelligence and its role. We are of the view that additional analytical capacity required to support ‘EBO of governance’ should exist in the form of an expanded staff specifically advising the NSCC. While the National Security Division of PMC would seem to be the logical candidate for such a role, several changes would be needed to provide the kind of analytical capacity described above. Ideally, a unit of this nature should be administratively removed from the day-to-day, short-term contingencies and coordination functions normally undertaken by a division of PMC. That is not to say that the unit should be entirely administratively removed from PMC. But it might be a statutory body linked in a similar way to the ONA. Or it might be more directly associated with the Cabinet Division. Further, the unit would require an expanded ability to provide advice on a ‘holistic’ basis, with a range of expertise covering scientific, health, intelligence, economic and defence issues. Already the germ of such a capability is contained within National Security Division. The existence of such a support unit would act as a buffer between the Cabinet and intelligence agencies and ensure that the latter continue to function as providers of intelligence rather than strategic advice. It would provide the capacity to meld factual and analytical work from both the intelligence agencies and those agencies outside the AIC, such as the various government scientific and economic agencies and non-government agencies. Its interface with such agencies would be far easier than between intelligence and outside agencies, given the role of intelligence in protecting information from human competition. Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) 65 Security Challenges In light of this position, the following issues emerge for the next government: x Australia’s national intelligence database should be expanded more fully to incorporate information and intelligence from agencies outside the AIC, such as the AFP, Customs, Coastwatch and the ACC. Details of how this might be accomplished are set out in an earlier paper by this author. 8 Leaving aside the security aspects of issues like climate change, pandemic disease and radical economic change, government should recognise that such issues in themselves are not conducive to analysis and advice from intelligence agencies. Rather, a ‘whole of government’ analytical and strategic capacity should be incorporated into the advice mechanisms serving the NSCC. This unit should incorporate the work of intelligence agencies, but also range far more broadly across government and non-government agencies. It should posses a ‘holistic’ capability— that is, it should include scientific, health and economic professionals as well as national security experts. It should not be constrained by the day-to-day needs of servicing a busy department like PMC. x Sandy Gordon joined the Australian Public Service in 1977, subsequently working in the Office of National Assessments, AusAID and as Executive Director of the Asian Studies Council and Australian Literacy Council. In 1990 he became a Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, where he worked on South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In 1997 he was appointed head of intelligence in the AFP, a position he held until 2000. He then became Co-Chair of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Transnational Crime Working Group and a member of the National Expert Advisory Committee on Illicit Drugs. Between 2003 and 2005, he lectured on terrorism and transnational crime at the Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales. He is currently Associate Professor, Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, University of Wollongong. [emailprotected] com. au. 8 Gordon, op. cit. 66 Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007)

History of statistics and its significance

History of statistics and its significance History of Statistics and its Significance Statistics is a relatively new subject, which branched from Probability Theory and is widely used in areas such as Economics and Astrology. It is a logic and methodology to measure uncertainty and it is used to do inferences on these uncertainties (Stigler, 1986). The history of Statistics can be firstly traced back to the 1600s. John Graunt (1620-1674) could be considered as the pioneer of statistics and as the author of the first book regarding statistics. He published Natural and Political observations on the Bills of Mortality in 1662 whereby he was studying the plague outbreak in London at the time requested by the King. Graunt was asked to come up with a system that would allow them to detect threats of further outbreaks, by keeping records of mortality and causes of death and making an estimation of the population. By forming the life table, Graunt discovered that statistically, the ratio of male to females are almost equal. Then in 1666, he collected data and started to exami ne life expectancies. All of this was fundamental as he was arguably the first to create a condensed life table from large data and was able to do some analysis on it. In addition, this is widely used in life insurance today, showing the importance and significance of Graunts work (Verduin, 2009). Another reason why this is significant is because of his ability in demonstrating the value of data collection (Stigler, 1986). Then in 1693, Edmond Halley extended Graunts ideas and formed the first mortality table that statistically made the relationship between age and death rates. Again, this is used in life insurance (Verduin, 2009). Another contributor to the formation of statistics is Abraham De Moivre (1667-1823). He was the first person to identify the properties of the normal curve and in 1711, introduced the notion of statistical independence (Verduin, 2009). In 1724, De Moivre studied mortality statistics and laid down foundations of the theory of annuities, inspired by the work of Halley. This is significant as annuities are widely used in the Finance industry today, in particular, when forming actuarial tables in life insurance. De Moivre then went on to talk about the idea of the normal distribution which can be used to approximate the binomial distribution (OConnor and Robertson, 2004). William Playfair (1759-1823) was the person who invented statistical graphics, which included the line graph and the bar graph chart in 1786 and the pie chart in 1801. He believed that charts were a better way to represent data and he was driven to this invention by a lack of data. This was a milestone as these graphical representations are used everywhere today, the most notable being the time-series graph, which is a graph containing many data points measured at successive uniform intervals over a period of time. These graphs can be used to examine data such as shares, and could be used to predict future data (Robyn 1978). Adolphe Quetlet (1796-1874) was the first person to apply probability and statistics to Social Sciences in 1835. He was interested in studying about human characteristics and suggested that the law of errors, which are commonly used in Astronomy, could be applied when studying people and through this, assumptions or predictions could be in regards to physical features and intellectual features of a person. Through Quetlets studies, he discovered that the distribution of certain characteristics when he made a diagram of it was in a shape of a bell curve. This was a significant discovery as Quetlet later went on to form properties of the normal distribution curve, which is a vital concept in Statistics today. Using this concept of average man, Quetlet used this to examine other social issues such as crime rates and marriage rates. He is also well known for the coming up with a formula called the Quetlet Index, or more commonly known as Body Mass Index, which is an indication or measure for obesity. This is still used today and you could find out your BMI by calculating. If you get an index of more than 30, it means the person is officially obese (OConnor and Robertson, 2006). Other members who made little but significance contributions to Statistics are Carl Gauss and Florence Nightingale. Gauss was the first person who played around with the least squares estimation method when he was interested in astronomy and attempted to predict the position of a planet. He later proved this method by assuming the errors are normally distributed. The method of least squares is widely used today, in Astronomy for example, in order to minimise the error and improve the accuracy of results or calculations (OConnor and Robertson, 1996). It was also the most commonly used method before 1827 when trying to combine inconsistent equations (Stigler, 1986). Nightingale was inspired by Quetlets work on statistical graphics and produced a chart detailing the deaths of soldiers where she worked. She later went on to analyse that state and care of medical facilities in India. This was significant as Nightingale applied statistics to health problems and this led to the improvement of medical healthcare. Her important works were recognised as became the first female to be a member of the Royal Statistical Society (Cohen, 1984). One of the greatest contributors was Francis Galton (1822-1911) who helped create a statistical revolution which laid foundations for future statisticians like Karl Pearson and Charles Spearman (Stigler, 1986). He was related to Charles Darwin and had many interests, such as Eugenics and Anthropology. He came up with a number of vital concepts, including the regression, standard deviation and correlation, which came about when Galton was studying sweet peas. He discovered that the successive sweet peas were of different sizes but regressed towards the mean size and the distribution of their parents (Gavan Tredoux, 2007). He later went on to work with the idea of correlation when he was studying the heights of parents and the parents children when they reach adulthood, where he made a diagram of his findings and found an obvious correlation between the two. He then performed a few other experiments and came to the conclusion that the index of the correlation was an indication to the d egree in which the two variables were related to one another. His studies were significant as they are all fundamental in Statistics today and these methods are used in many areas for data analysis, especially with extracting meaningful information between different factors (OConnor and Robertson, 2003). The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty before 1900 Stephen M Stigelr Publisher: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, March 1, 1990 p1, 4, 40, 266 http://www.leidenuniv.nl/fsw/verduin/stathist/stathist.htm A short History of Probability and Statistics Kees Verduin Last Updated: March 2009 Last Accessed: 02/04/2010 http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Biographies/De_Moivre.html The MacTutor History of Mathematics archive Article by: J J OConnor and E F Robertson Copyright June 2004 Last Accessed: 05/04/2010 The American Statistician Volume: 32, No: 1 Quantitative graphics in statistics: A brief history James R. Beniger and Dorothy L. Robyn p1-11 http://www-groups.dcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/~history/Biographies/Quetelet.html The MacTutor History of Mathematics archive Article by: J J OConnor and E F Robertson Copyright August 2006 Last Accessed: 06/04/2010 http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Biographies/Gauss.html The MacTutor History of Mathematics archive Article by: J J OConnor and E F Robertson Copyright December 1996 Last Accessed: 06/04/2010 Scientific American 250 Florence Nightingale I. Bernard Cohen March 1984, p128-37/p98-107depending on country of sale http://galton.org/ Francis Galton Edited and Maintained by: Gavan Tredoux Last Updated: 12/11/07 (according to the update in News section) Last Accessed: 07/04/2010 http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Biographies/Galton.html The MacTutor History of Mathematics archive Article by: J J OConnor and E F Robertson Copyright October 2003 Last Accessed: 07/04/2010

Use of Mise en Scene in the Film Yellow Earth :: Movie Film Essays

Use of Mise en Scene in the Film Yellow Earth The film â€Å"Yellow Earth† is the sad tale of a girl being forced to follow her â€Å"fate.† She sees an opportunity to escape in a foreigner, a soldier from the south. In this film, director Chen Kaige and cinematographer Zhang Yimou create windows into their characters. Several scenes are made more significant because of the use of mise en scene. This technique allows the viewer to see everything that happens during the course of the scene. The most impactful scene is perhaps when the soldier Gu is first brought into their home. Although the camera will show different shots, time is still continuous. It is not an interruption and is only moving to provide the audience with a better view. The continuousness of time is important because the audience knows everything that is occurring between the characters. The viewer hears their conversations and their silences. This use if mise en scene allows the viewer to get a sense of the tension between Gu and the family (as he is a newcomer), and between Cuiqiao and the others. There are two main angles that Yimou uses in this scene. One is centered on Gu and the other is centered on Cuiqiao, from slightly to the right of Gu’s perspective. Whenever the shot is facing Gu, it is at his level. Everything is level with his camera angle and straight with his life. Cuiqiao’s angle, however, is looking down on her. This is reflective of her current emotional state. She is sorrowful and repressed. Whenever a character performs an important action, the camera shows them. The first time that Cuiqiao and Han Han are spoken to, they become visible. Also, we see Cuiqiao’s reactions when they are important to her characterization. Gu speaks somewhat about the South and how free and wonderful it is. Cuiqiao’s curiosity is expressed on her face. The audience also sees Cuiqiao forgetting about what she is doing with the bellows.

Machiavelli: The Realist Essay

Political realism did not become a popular concept until it was discussed by Niccolà ² Machiavelli, making him one of the most influential philosophers. According to another philosopher, Francis Bacon, Machiavelli was â€Å"the founder of a new, objective science of politics, concerned not with what should be, but with what is, not with hopes and fears, but with practical realities† (Wootton XXXVII). Machiavelli’s handbook for princes, titled The Prince, takes the world as it is and gives advice through the discussion of real world examples. Max Lerner, the deceased American journalist, once stated, â€Å"May I venture a guess as to the reason why we still shudder slightly at Machiavelli’s name†¦ It is our recognition that the realities he describes are realities; that men, whether in politics, in business, or in private life, do not act according to their professions of virtue.† When people read Machiavelli’s text they are astounded by some of his remarks. However, he persistently uses examples to validate that what he is saying. Although people may not want to accept his comments, he is merely making observations. Throughout his handbook, it is made evident that Machiavelli is indeed a realist. Throughout his handbook, Machiavelli makes it evident that he is indeed a realist through his examination of why a commitment to integrity and virtue is not possible for successful leadership, but deception, cruelty, and war are essential. The essential perception of reporting what actually occurs is expressed by Machiavelli. In explaining his purpose for writing The Prince, he states, â€Å"But my hope is to write a book that will be useful, at least to those who read it intelligently, and so I thought it sensible to go straight to a discussion of how things are in real life and not waste time with a discussion of an imaginary world† (Machiavelli 48). Unlike most other philosophers, Machiavelli does not believe in creating a utopia. He prefers to state the truth and make conclusions based on real events, which is exactly what he does throughout the text. According to Machiavelli: Many authors have constructed imaginary republics and principalities that have never existed in practice and never could; for the gap between how people actually behave and how they ought to behave is so great that anyone who ignores everyday reality in order to live up to an ideal will soon discover he has been taught how to destroy himself, not how to preserve himself. (Machiavelli 48) Machiavelli uses examples from the present time as well as the past to illustrate his advice for the princes. For example, Machiavelli refers to a contemporary Italian prince, whom he feels is a model of the ideal prince, on several occasions. His name is Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander VI. One time Machiavelli refers to him is when discussing individuals who acquire principalities through fortune. Instead of creating a hypothetical situation in which a person receives principalities through luck and making up possible outcomes, Machiavelli directly cites Borgia who received land from his father. He asserts, â€Å"Cesare Borgia, who was called Duke Valentino by the common people, acquired his state thanks to the good fortune of his father, and when that came to an end he lost it† (Machiavelli 22). By using real occurrences, Machiavelli’s advice becomes more convincing. The people know that he is basing his guidance on events which have actually taken place, and therefore they accept more of what he has to say. Machiavelli’s criticism of human nature is infamous for the obvious reason that he bashes humans. The words he uses to describe humans all have a negative connotation. While they may seem incredibly harsh, he is only stating the truth. Machiavelli explains, â€Å"For of men one can, in general, say this: They are ungrateful, fickle, deceptive and deceiving, avoiders of danger, eager to gain† (Machiavelli 52). While some may argue that they do not possess these negative characteristics, Machiavelli disagrees arguing that while they may not show them, they are capable of them. He continues on to describe humans as being self-preserved. â€Å"As long as you serve their interests, they are devoted to you. They promise you their blood, their possessions, their lives, and their children, as I said before, so long as you seem to have no need of them. But as soon as you need help, they turn against you† (Machiavelli 52). People are willing to give up all that they have, but when the time comes to actually give their belongings away, they run away. This assumption that humans are being of pitiless self-interest follows with political realism. Machiavelli furthers his negative remarks about human beings when he discusses virtue. Based on Machiavelli’s use of the word virtue, he seems to be referring to qualities that would earn praise. He states several praiseworthy characteristics that most humans would think are beneficial to possess. Machiavelli continues pointing out: Now I know everyone will agree that if a ruler could have all the good qualities I have listed and none of the bad ones, then this would be an excellent state of affairs. But one cannot have all the good qualities, nor always act in a praiseworthy fashion, for we do not live in an ideal world. (Machiavelli 48) While his point is intended for princes, it can be applied to humans as well. His earlier case about humans being self-absorbed and fickle can apply here as well. He acknowledges that it would be better for society if everyone acted virtuously, but it is not an ideal world. Therefore, since not everyone can possess only good qualities, he turns to a blatant reality that people must be deceiving. They need to pretend to have positive characteristics in order to fool those who oppose them. He believes the good traits are more advantageous if a person merely seems to possess them. A person should seem to be compassionate, trustworthy, sympathetic, honest, and religious instead of actually being those things. Machiavelli makes clear that virtue is not possible for a prince to be successful. He emphasizes the need for deception, and then moves on to discuss cruelty. Machiavelli explains that while it is good to be loved by your people, it is better to be feared. This is because men who love you will remain loyal until they fear their interests are at stake and run away. If the men are afraid of you, then they will not be able to run away because their fear will restrain them. Machiavelli states, â€Å"†¦for it is impossible to keep an army united and ready for action without acquiring a reputation for cruelty† (Machiavelli 52). If a prince wants control and order, then he needs to be feared. According to Machiavelli, cruelty is the way to achieve this goal and is essential if a prince wishes to maintain his power. The third necessity for a prince to remain a leader is to be powerful during war. Machiavelli, who clearly believes it is important to refer to the past as a guide, advises rulers to read history books and study the actions of men who succeeded. He declares, â€Å"[A ruler] should see how they conducted themselves when at war, study why they won some battles and lost others, so he will know what to imitate and what to avoid† (Machiavelli 47). By learning about past leaders, a prince can imitate the actions of historical figures who are admirable in order to make himself better. Machiavelli’s emphasis on war may come from the fact that, during this time, Italy is in pieces, and he wishes for it to be united. He encourages rulers to â€Å"only think of military matters† and states that â€Å"in time of peace he should be even more occupied with them than in time of war† (Machiavelli 46). A prince should constantly be a step ahead of his enemies, and, therefore, needs to persistently focus on how he can be better prepared for war. By having a good army and a set plan, a ruler is able to maintain his power. Although many people criticize Machiavelli for his outrageous political realism, he was discussing the truth about reality. Some people may see it as harsh, but sometimes the truth hurts. Machiavelli states, â€Å"So it is necessary for a ruler, if he wants to hold on to power, to learn how not to be good, and to know when it is and when it is not necessary to use this knowledge† (Machiavelli 48). He explains in depth why honesty and virtue are not factors in determining a prince’s success. Instead, a prince needs to be deceiving, cruel, and a powerful military ruler in order to keep his power. Works Cited Machiavelli, Niccolà ². The Prince. Trans. David Wootton. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995. Print.

Identity in Salman Rushdie essays

Identity in Salman Rushdie essays Examine the construction of identity in Salman Rushdies Midnights Children. Colonialism is the consolidation of imperial power through the attempt to govern lands that are now occupied. Postcolonial literature sets out to oppose the colonialist perspective. They develop a perspective that retrieves states of marginality and is concerned with mans quest for his identity. Postcolonial theories relate the quest of their individual hero or heroines to the past of their lives. Salman Rushdie born in an Indian Muslim family is a postcolonial writer. After graduating Rushdie returned home to Pakistan where his parents had moved, whilst there he felt a sense of alienation having been so long away from his cultural roots that he decided to return to England. This is a feeling that many of the postcolonial writers identify with. Many of these writers like Salman Rushdie, Sunetra Gupta and Rukhsana Ahmed are caught in between two cultures that in many cases are very contrasting. It is very difficult for these writers to adapt to both cultures and because of his they find it difficult to construct their identity. This is a problem that the narrator Saleem Sinai faces in Salman Rushdies novel Midnights Children. The search for a country with secular ideals is one of the themes of Midnights Children. Rushdie makes an attempt to explore some of the darkness of that experience by relating the family history of Saleem to the history of Indias freedom struggle. Saleems search for identity parallels to and is directly connected with the history of a nation that is constructing itself. Saleem was born at the hour that ends the British Raj, sustains the identities of a narrator and becomes the consciousness of the whole country. Saleem assumes many identities he is a distinctive mixture of the creation of Indian culture and that of Islamic tradi...